The macroeconomic response to the economic crisis has revived old debates about the usefulness of monetary and fiscal policy in fighting recessions. Without the ability to further lower interest rates, policy authorities in many countries have turned to expansionary fiscal policies. Recent literature argues that government spending may be very effective in such environments. But a critical element of the stimulus packages in all countries was the use of deficit financing and tax reductions. This paper explores the role of government debt and deficits in an economy constrained by the zero bound on nominal interest rates. Given that the liquidity trap is generated by a large increase in the desire to save on the part of the private sector, the wealth effects of government deficits can provide a critical macroeconomic response to this. Government spending .financed by deficits may be far more expansionary than that financed by tax increases in such an environment. In a liquidity trap, tax cuts may be much more effective than during normal times. Finally, monetary policies aimed at directly increasing monetary aggregates may be effective, even if interest rates are unchanged.
Introduction
The dramatic policy response to the 2008-2009 global economic crisis followed by many countries has revived some old debates about the use of …scal and monetary policy in …ghting recessions. The central dilemma for policy-makers in Japan, North America and Europe has been to try to counter a large recession brought on by an unprecedented fall in private consumption and investment spending, but at the same time being constrained by the inability to lower nominal interest rates below their current near-zero level. The end-result was an ad hoc series of …scal and monetary measures -de…cit …nanced government spending increases, tax cuts, and 'unconventional' monetary policy measures such as open market purchases on long-dated securities, direct increases in the monetary base, etc. Coming under the catch-all term of 'stimulus-packages', the design of these policies did not come from theoretical frameworks or quantitative macro-economic models of the style that have been explored within central banks for the last decade, but rather produced from 'back of the envelope'style arguments about the size of …scal multipliers and the impact of liquidity injections on credit ‡ows.
At the same time, there has been a vigorous debate within the economics profession about the usefulness of …scal and monetary stimulus at all 1 . One fact that has been less well recognized perhaps is that the central dilemma about the options for economic policy in a liquidity trap has been extensively studied within the recent vintage of New Keynesian DSGE models in light of the 1990's experience of Japan. In particular, Krugman (1998) One key aspect of the e¤ects of …scal and monetary policy in a liquidity trap that seems to have so far gone relatively unexplored is the role that government de…cits and debt issue plays as part of a stimulus package. On the one hand, there has been overwhelming agreement among policy practioners that in order to be useful, …scal stimulus must be …nanced with debt rather than compensating tax increases, and also that part of the stimulus could be 1 See for instance Krugman (2009) , and the response by Cochrane (2009) .
based on tax cuts rather than spending increases. But in most of the existing classes of New Keynesian DSGE models that examine …scal and monetary policies in a liquidity trap, the distinction between tax …nanced and debt …nanced …scal stimulus is irrelevant (and tax cuts that leave the present value of taxation unchanged are also irrelevant), because these models are characterized by Ricardian equivalence, with in…nitely lived consumers and in…nite planning horizons.
It would seem then that in order to o¤er a serious analysis of the role of …scal stimulus in a liquidity trap, it is necessary to depart from the benchmark assumption of the in…nitely lived Ramsey consumer. This paper takes a …rst step in this direction. Following a number of recent papers (e.g. Annichiarrico et al 2008), we amend the basic New Keynesian sticky price model of Woodford (2003) and Clarida Gali and Gertler (1999) by incorporating …-nite planning horizons in the manner of Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965) . This means that government spending …nanced by debt has di¤erent e¤ects than that …nanced by tax increases, that government debt itself has wealth e¤ects for currently-alive households, that pure lump-sum tax cuts may be expansionary, and moreover, that monetary policy aimed at increasing the outstanding stock of monetary aggregates may have direct 'real balance' e¤ects independently of its e¤ect (or non-e¤ect) on nominal interest rates.
We explore the impacts of …scal and monetary policy in this model, and contrast the results with the recent literature on policy in a liquidity trap. We focus on a scenario where a large increase in the desire to save on the part of households pushes down the economy's underlying real interest rate, and in an economy with sticky prices, causes a fall in aggregate demand output and in ‡ation.
Our central results may be summarised brie ‡y. We …nd that in an environment where monetary policy rules work 'normally', adjusting interest rates in response to in ‡ation and output 'gaps', the introduction of …nite planning horizons has little to o¤er with respect to the analysis of the impacts of …scal policy and monetary policy shocks. When the model is calibrated to introduce empirically realistic planning horizons, there is little quantitative impact of the deviation from Ricardian equivalence. In our benchmark model, for instance, the 'balanced budget' government spending multiplier is unity, and the multiplier implied by purely de…cit …nanced government spending is only slightly larger.
By contrast, when policy is constrained by 'a liquidity trap', there may be a dramatic di¤erence between the response of the economy with an e¤ectively in…nite planning horizon and that with …nite horizon. Equivalently, the impact of de…cit …nancing of …scal policies may be much greater than policies …nanced by taxes. In our benchmark model, the balanced budget government spending multiplier is also unity, even in a liquidity trap. But the multiplier for a de…cit …nanced government spending expansion is over 2. Intuitively, the model predicts that government debt issue has substantial wealth e¤ects in a liquidity trap.
These wealth e¤ects stimulate aggregate demand and private consumption, and play an expansionary macroeconomic role, aside from the direct e¤ects of government spending.
Another perspective is as follows. In an economy with Ricardian equivalence and no capital, a large increase in the desire to save cannot be satis…ed in equilibrium. In a ‡exible price world, we would simply see a fall in real interest rates. In a liquidity trap, where prices are sticky, the adjustment has to take place through a large fall in current output and consumption (see Christiano et al (2009) for an explication of this argument). But in a world with …nite horizon consumers, government debt issue in e¤ect provides a vehicle for saving on the part of the private sector. This satis…es part of their increase in the desire to save, and as a result, places a limit on the degree to which aggregate demand and consumption has to fall. E¤ectively, our results suggest that this macroeconomic role of government debt issue can play an important part in a …scal stimulus package during a liquidity trap.
We also show that the role of government debt issue is essentially equivalent, in our model, to the utilization of the 'real balance'e¤ect in monetary expansion. As a corollary then, the model implies that this real balance e¤ect may be negligible in normal times, but play a non-trivial role during a liquidity trap. Again, however, a key requirement for it to work is that Ricardian equivalence fails.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section brie ‡y discusses the nature of …scal and monetary policy responses to the recent crisis. The next section develops the basic model to be used throughout the paper. Section 4 discusses the nature of the steady state in the model. Section 5 and 6 outline the impact of government spending, tax, and debt shocks in the model when the economy is both outside and within a liquidity trap, both qualitatively and quantitatively. A …nal channel of monetary policy is through communications and the targeting of expectations. Even if interest rates remain at zero for some considerable period, the monetary authority can in ‡uence current conditions by announcing its intention to maintain low interest rates even after the recovery is underway. By doing so, the authority can in ‡uence current spending decisions of the private sector, to the extent that they are based on the projected path of interest rates into the future. This tool has been a key part of the communications strategy of all central banks over the last year.
Fiscal stimulus policies
Since monetary policy has essentially reached the limit of its e¤ectiveness, virtually all governments, both in advanced economies and emerging market economies, instigated …scal stimulus packages. Following the G20 meetings in late 2008, in conjunction with the IMF policy recommendations, a rough consensus emerged on a need for …scal stimulus equal to 2 percent of GDP. The breakdown between direct spending and tax cuts was not directly prescribed however. Table 1 describes the composition of the stimulus packages in the G20
economies. In terms of GDP per capita, after Saudi Arabia, China and the US bring the largest …scal stimulus, with 5 and 6 percent of GDP, respectively. But the packages di¤er sharply in their composition, with China's stimulus plan having no tax cut component at all, while in the US about a third of the overall stimulus is in the form of tax cuts. Britain's plan is mostly comprised on tax cuts, while Russia and Brazil's stimulus has only tax cuts.
But even without tax cuts, all stimulus plans have been …nanced by large increases in public sector de…cits. Table 2 illustrates the pre-crisis and post-crisis …scal balances (projected)
for G-20 countries. Many of the advanced economies already had very weak …scal positions already in 2007, but de…cits dramatically increased in most of these countries over the last year, and are projected to remain far above the pre-crisis trend until 2014 at least. Emerging economies were generally in a much better …scal position before the crisis, but most of these countries also have had a signi…cant increase in the …scal de…cit.
While there is signi…cant consensus on the need for …scal stimulus, the magnitude of the increase in public sector debt, especially among the advanced economies, has raised considerable concerns (IMF). Table 3 gives the projections for public sector debt for G20
countries. Higher debt has the potential to raise long term real interest rates, crowding out investment spending and growth, and also potentially raises the prospect of higher future rates of in ‡ation.
In the analysis below, we discuss a model of the short term alone, abstracting from the long run costs of …scal de…cits. The key aim of the paper is to illustrate how, in the short run, de…cits may have dramatically di¤erent e¤ects whether the economy is inside or outside a liquidity trap. While we do not dismiss the dangers of increasing public sector debt, it remains true that, at least for the larger economies, these dangers are more in the future than the present. At present, both the path of long term interest rates and in ‡ationary expections in most advanced economies seem to indicate little concern for unsustainable debt levels or high future in ‡ation.
3 The model of overlapping generations
Demographics and Households
We employ a very standard Blanchard (1985 households is born, where 0 6 6 1. An individual household dies with probability 1 in each period, independent of age, so that is the probability of survival from one period to the next. Thus, the total population at any time t is t s= 1 (1 ) t s = 1. As in Blanchard's model, we assume a full annuities market, whereby savers get a premium on lending to cover their unintended bequests, and borrowers pay a premium to cover their posthumous debts. Let the utility of a cohort born at date v, evaluated from date 0 be de…ned as:
Here we de…ne C t;v as the consumption in time t of cohort v, and H t;v is labor supply.
Households supply labour in all periods of life, but real wages are declining over an agent's lifetime in the manner suggested by Blanchard and Fischer (1989) . We assume that the composite consumption good represented by C t;v is di¤erentiated across a continuum of individual goods, so that
where is the elasticity of substitution across individual brands. Households also derive utility from aggregate government spending, denoted G t . Government spending is taken as given by each household, and utility from government spending is separable from utility of consumption C t;v . We assume that g 0 (:) > 0; g 00 (:) < 0:
We focus on a model without capital, so as to make the comparison with the standard neo-Keynesian DSGE model as clear as possible. Households have only one form of 'outside' savings instrument; government bonds. The budget constraint in time t for an agent born in time v 6 t is
Here B t+1;v represent the nominal bond holdings of cohort v, and T t;v represents their net tax liability to the government.
is the consumer price index.
Real wages in terms of the composite consumption good are denoted w t;v , which are cohortspeci…c, as described below. Pro…ts from …rms are represented by t;v : The presence of full annuity markets implies that rates of return are grossed up to cover the probability of death.
To see this, note that in aggregate, savers will receive a return of (1+it) +(1 ) 0 = (1+i t )
on their bond holdings.
Maximizing utility subject to these two constraints gives the conditions:
Conditions (3)- (4) characterize optimal consumption and labor supply. In addition, the household must choose individual brands to minimize expenditure conditional on a given composite consumption. The familiar condition for the optimal brand choice is given by:
The Euler equation, in conjunction with the household budget constraint, can be represented in the 'certainty equivalent'representation 3 :
where 1 + r t = below, we will tie this wage di¤erential to e¤ective labour productivity di¤erences across time. In addition, in order to allow for easy aggregation to an economy-wide consumption function, we assume that cohort-speci…c pro…ts and taxes obey the same properties as wage income. 3 This representation ignores complications due to Jensen's inequality, and is presented simply to give a heuristic account of the aggregation process. The analysis of the model is done by …rst order approximation however, and the solution of the aggregate model is exact at this order. Thus, the error has no consequences for the results below. 4 a is chosen so that when the cohort speci…c wage is averaged across all currently alive cohorts, it equals the economy wide average wage. This requires that a = 
Aggregation
To represent economy-wide outcomes, we need to aggregate across cohorts. One immediate aggregation di¢ culty arises from (4). Because a) households have di¤erent consumption levels, and b) each cohort has a di¤erent productivity of labor in production of …nal goods, it will not be possible to aggregate (4) across generations, in general. To proceed, we then make the following speci…c functional form assumption:
Thus, we assume that the disutility of work is linear in hours worked. In that case, we can aggregate (4) directly across all currently alive cohorts. This restricts the analysis somewhat, but has the appeal that it leads to a simple prediction for the impacts of monetary and …scal policy shocks when nominal interest rates are positive, and when full Ricardian equivalence holds. The key question we address is how allowing for both of these features to be relaxed (zero-interest rates and non-Ricardian equivalence) together impacts on the e¤ects of policy.
The assumption (6) allows us to write the aggregate labor supply condition as:
The consumption expression (5) may be aggregated across cohorts to give:
where
In aggregate, the budget constraint for all households is:
Note that in the aggregate, there is no term in the ‡ow budget constraint, since the risk premium just represents a transfer from one generation to another.
Then manipulating (8) and (9), we can write the aggregate Euler equation as:
In contrast to the standard Ramsey model, in this model, the growth in aggregate consumption depends on both interest rates and aggregate wealth. When < 1; and aggregate wealth is positive, aggregate consumption growth is lower than in the Ramsey model, be-cause the average households is e¤ectively less patient. Equivalently, a rise in the value of government debt generates a wealth e¤ect which reduces desired aggregate savings.
Firms
Retail goods …rms hire labor and capital in order to produce their individual brands, using the production function:
is …rm i's composite employment. The expression H t (i; s; j) represents the employment by …rm i of household j of cohort s. Each household in a given cohort s has an identical e¤ective labour productivity a t;s , captured by the process described above. The idea is that labour of di¤erent vintages have di¤erent e¢ ciencies, and since < 1, labor income per unit of e¤ort tends to decline over time, for each cohort. This is an important feature of the model, since it gives each generation a downward sloping income pro…le over their planning horizon. E¤ectively, it allows for a greater desire to save on the part of each cohort, and puts the model closer to the standard OLG model with working and retirement phases of life.
We abstract from capital accumulation, but allow for the presence of a …xed factor of production, so that 0 6 6 1. Finally, A t is a productivity term, common to all …rms.
Retail …rms are monopolistically competitive, and face an elasticity of demand given by > 1 in each period. Firms adjust their prices according to the usual Calvo assumption of a constant probability of price change, 1 , however long ago the previous price change was made. When they adjust their price, …rms maximize discounted expected pro…ts, where per period pro…ts for each …rm i are
discounted pro…t is written as:
# where W t = w t P t is the aggregate nominal wage, and the …rm's demand function is Y t (i) =
The pro…t maximizing price for …rm i , setting its price at time t is then
Each newly price setting …rm sets the same price. Then, using the law of large numbers, the price index is then
Fiscal authority
The …scal authority has expenditure commitments arising from net transfers to households and direct government spending. For now, we do not separately consider nominal money balances in the model, so there is no direct measure of seignoriages revenues. Thus, the …scal authority obtains revenue simply from net tax receipts T t and nominal debt issue. The government budget constraint is given by:
We allow for a number of di¤erent possible con…gurations of …scal policy rules. One such rule is to take the path of government spending as exogenously given to the …scal authority, and adjust the net transfer so as to achieve a given target for the debt to GDP ratio.
Alternatively, net transfers could be adjusted so as to keep the government budget in balance in every period, maintaining a constant path of (real or nominal) government debt.
Monetary policy
Assume that the monetary authority follows an interest rate rule, given by:
where t represents a desired path for the equilibrium real interest rate, represents a desired path for the in ‡ation rate, and b Y is the target level of aggregate output. We assume that > 1 and y > 0. This rule is somewhat unrealistic in that we do not allow for interest rate 'smoothing'. This is not critical for the results, however.
The monetary authority can follow the rule (14) only when i R t > 0 however. If the rule stipulates a negative nominal interest rate, then the central bank is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Thus, the path of nominal interest rates in the model must be governed by:
Equilibrium conditions
Now, combining (9), (11), and (13) the aggregate resource constraint for the …nal composite good is:
The zero lower bound condition (15) is usually thought of as a constraint on the short run behavior of monetary policy. But this is not necessarily the case. For instance, if the monetary authority has a long turn target for in ‡ation that is low enough, it is possible that the long run real interest rate is forced down to the level where the zero bound is a binding constraint. Although this has no consequences for the long run path of output, it does place a condition on the required path of real government debt. We explore this issue brie ‡y in the next section.
Long run ‡exible price equilibrium
In a ‡exible price equilibrium (7) and (12) give the solution for equilibrium aggregate output:
From (17), the long-run government spending multiplier is given by
where g y G Y < 1. The multiplier is increasing in the steady state ratio of government spending to GDP, but it must be no greater than unity.
as the long run government debt to GDP ratio. For a given value of g y ;
the long run real interest rate is determined by the steady state version of (10):
. The real interest rate is increasing in the steady state government debt-GDP ratio. In this model, without capital, government debt does not crowd out real investment, and has no e¤ect on steady state aggregate output or consumption. But a higher b y increases real interest rates, and tilts the pro…le of consumption of each generation towards the future.
The steady state nominal interest rate is obtained from (14) , taking the desired real interest rate as constant.
For a given target rate of real interest rate, in ‡ation, and output, there may be more than one in ‡ation rate satisfying these conditions, where i is de…ned by (15) . For instance, one equilibrium is given by = b ; Y = b Y and i = . But another equilibrium is given by:
Benhabib et al. (2002) were the …rst to demonstrate that Taylor rules will in general be associated with multiple equilibrium rates of in ‡ation when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. Here we focus only on equilibria with positive in ‡ation rates, where the steady state in ‡ation rate is equal to the target rate b 5 . In this economy, there is only one such equilibrium consistent with (19) and (15) . Thus, we may re-write (20) as
The two conditions (19) and (22) have separate interpretations, depending upon whether the nominal interest rate is positive or at the zero lower bound. When i > 0, the conditions determine i and r separately, for given b and b y . The steady state monetary rule (14) determines b ; while b y is determined by steady state …scal policy, consistent with (13), in conjunction with an appropriate transversality condition. Thus, monetary and …scal policy can be thought of as independent in a steady state with i > 0. Moreover, there is a recursive structure such that the …scal stance, summarized by the value of b y , determines r, while the in ‡ation target determines i.
But (19) and (22) may also be associated with an equilibrium where i = 0; the nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound. From (22) , this can occur only if r < 0; that is, if the economy is dynamically ine¢ cient. From (19) , dynamic ine¢ ciency can occur, even when b y > 0, when < 1. If each cohort has a declining wage pro…le over time, the economy may be dynamically ine¢ cient even if government debt to GDP is positive.
The behavior of the steady state under the zero lower bound is fundamentally di¤erent from that with i > 0: Putting (19) and (22) together in the case when i = 0, we obtain the single relationship:
Condition (24) de…nes the sense in which monetary and …scal policy are interdependent in an economy at the zero lower bound 6 . If the government debt-GDP ratio is such that the equilibrium real interest rate is negative, then the target rate of in ‡ation must be uniquely determined. Conversely, if the target rate of in ‡ation is taken as given, then the debt-GDP ratio must be adjusted so as to achieve the equilibrium real interest implied by this target.
Moreover, at the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, the steady state is no longer recursive. A higher value of T implies a lower (more negative) real interest rate, and must be accompanied by a fall in b y , holding g y and all the other variables constant. Figure 2 illustrates the trade-o¤ implied by (24) . In the Figure, e b y represents the value of the debt ratio for which r = 0, implied by (19) . For b y < e b y ; the real interest rate is negative. Whether the economy is stuck at the zero lower bound depends on the in ‡ation target. The schedule MF illustrates (24) . For a given b y < e b y ; the lower is the in ‡ation target, the more likely that the economy will be at the zero lower bound. MF describes the required values of b y for each value of the in ‡ation target, when the economy is stuck at the zero lower bound. Thus, in a steady state, there must be a negative relationship between government debt and the in ‡ation rate, when the economy is at the zero lower bound 7 .
Intuitively, the condition says that, in the long run, if monetary authorities are committed to low in ‡ation targets, then low real interest rate episodes are likely to push them to the zero bound. If they continue to be committed by a low in ‡ation target at the zero bound, then it really means that they are preventing the real interest rate from falling any further.
This can only be done through giving up control of the outstanding stock of government debt. Equivalently, if the …scal authority insists on reducing the stock of real debt in an environment where the real interest rate is pushed below zero, then the monetary authorities must accommodate this with a higher rate of in ‡ation. In either case, with a permanent zero nominal interest rate, there must be a negative relationship between government debt and in ‡ation. 6 Leeper (2010) provides an alternative view of the interaction between monetary and …scal policy even when nominal interest rates are positive, based on the interdependence implied by the public sector budget constraint. 7 Beaudry, Devereux and Siu (2009) examine this restriction in a more complete dynamic growth model. Condition (24) abstracts from the possibility of bubble equilibria. When the real interest rate is negative, it is possible that other non-fundamental assets may be valued in equilibrium, so that total wealth would include both the value of government debt and the bubble asset.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Short-Run under a zero lower bound
We now turn to an analysis of the model in the short run, when prices adjust as in (12) Under what circumstances should the policymaker face a zero interest rate constraint?
As in the previous literature, we may think of this situation as generated by a large increase in the representative agents'discount factor, raising desired savings and pushing down the ‡exible price equilibrium real interest rate. If the policy maker follows a Taylor rule, as in (14) , then the nominal interest rate may be pushed down to its lower bound. The increase in desired savings leads to a fall in aggregate demand and a fall in the output gap. The optimal response to this shock in normal times would be to reduce nominal interest rates so as to facilitate the required real interest rate adjustment. But when nominal interest rates are zero, they cannot be reduced further. How should policy respond? Two main answers have been o¤ered in the literature. Krugman (1998), Jung et al (2005) , and Eggertson and Woodford (2003) discuss a range of alternative monetary policy rules that may be used despite the fact that the interest rate is held at or near zero for some time. The common feature of of these proposals is that the policy maker should make an announcement about the conduct of monetary policy in the periods after the economy has left the zero bound region. If the authority announces that policy will remain loose even after the zero bound no longer binds, then it acts so as to lessen the de ‡ationary impact of the current shock.
The obvious di¢ culty with using monetary policy in this way is that the announcement must be credible for it to have any e¤ect on current output and in ‡ation. The policy-maker must follow a history-dependent rule, continuing to pursue monetary easing even after the conditions that warrant such easing have elapsed. Eggertson and Woodford (2003) discuss a range of targets for the monetary authority to follow that would replicate the optimal history dependent rule, but may be easier to communicate to the public.
The One common characteristic of the previous literature analyzing the role of policy at the zero lower bound is that the models display Ricardian equivalence. Hence, the …nancing of government spending expansion has no role to play, and the real balance e¤ects of monetary policy are not operative. In the recent policy discussion summarised in Section 1, however, the need to run government de…cits, generated either by tax cuts or bond …nanced government spending increases, is seen as a paramount part of the stimulus package in all countries.
The notion that the large …scal expansions that are taking place in many countries could just as easily be …nanced with tax increases as with government de…cits seems completely at variance with all policy discussion. Hence, it is important to be able to analyze the impact of …scal de…cits when interest rates are stuck at the zero lower bound, and to compare this with the case where interest rates are employed as part of a regular monetary policy. The advantage of using the current model is that we can separately analyze the role played by tax cuts and spending increases, and distinguish between debt …nanced and tax-…nanced …scal expansion. In addition, we may analyze separately the real balance e¤ects monetary policy, which can operate even at zero interest rates 8 .
Approximating the model under a Taylor rule.
In the case where nominal interest rates are positive and adjust according to (14) , we have a standard New Keynesian model, save for the presence of government debt in the Euler equation (10) . Using (10) and (16), we may approximate (10) as follows:
, and
. The linear approximation is taken around an initial debt-GDP ratio equal to zero 9 , so that b = 0. The government spending shock represents a deviation of government spending from the steady state level, relative to GDP. We are assuming that there is an optimal ( ‡exible price equilibrium) level of government spending to given by G; and movements in government spending here represent deviations from the optimum. The variable b t represents a temporary shock to the discount factor, where we assume that the discount factor can be represented as t = exp( t ), and the steady state value of , is set at zero; = 0. The departure from full Ricardian equivalence is governed by the composite coe¢ cient , which depends on the steady state discount rate, the probability of survival, and the time path of labor income within each cohort.
The forward looking in ‡ation equation follows in standard fashion from the …rst order approximation of (12) and the de…nition of the price index.
. The term in brackets represents the deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state level, given the assumptions on the disutility of labour for each generation.
The linear approximation of the interest rate rule is written as:
In this section, we assume that i R t > 0, so that the interest rate always follows (27) . Finally, we take a linear approximation of the government budget constraint as follows:
. Since we are approximating around an initial steady state with a zero debt-GDP ratio, this approximation does not depend on the …rst order dynamics of the real interest rate. On its own however, (28) will involve non-stationary dynamics in the government debt-ratio. To avoid this, we assume that the …scal authority chooses a tax rule so that the dynamics of aggregate government debt to GDP are stationary, for given government spending movements. In particular, we assume that net taxes have a discretionary and an automatic component, such that:
where t is constant, and is chosen such that ! = 1 + r t < 1: This ensures that following a temporary shock to government spending or the discretionary component of taxes which leaves the long run real primary de…cit unchanged, the debt level will return to its steady state.
Shocks to the the discount factor
A natural way to think about policy being constrained by the lower bound on interest rates is that an increased desire to save drives down the equilibrium ‡exible price real interest rate. Under an in ‡ation targeting monetary rule, this requires a fall in the nominal interest rate. The variable b t , representing a shock to the discount factor, increases the ex-ante savings rate of all generations. Assume that b t is governed by the process:
An increase in the discount factor leads to a persistent fall in the equilibrium real interest rate. Using the interest rate rule (27) , the impact of the shock can be obtained from the solution to (25)- (29). The increase in the discount factor increases the desire to save, reducing aggregate demand, causing a fall in both output and in ‡ation. The responses of output and in ‡ation are given by:
where z = ; and
The impact of a discount factor shock is cushioned by the endogenous response of interest rates. The higher the response of interest rates to in ‡ation and the output gap, the smaller is the e¤ect of the shock. In the framework of optimal monetary policy as presented in Woodford (2003) , a discount factor shock can be fully accommodated by an optimal monetary response that goes beyond the interest rate rule, reducing nominal interest rates by the extent of the shock itself, fully stabilizing output and in ‡ation. But this requires that the authorities have su¢ cient leeway to adjust the nominal interest rate downwards. For large enough shocks, the zero bound on the interest rate may apply, and some alternative monetary or …scal policy needs to be employed in order to respond to the shock. Before we analyze the response of the economy under a zero bound, however, we investigate the impact of …scal policy shocks when the nominal interest rate is positive, and the economy operates under the monetary rule (27).
Government Spending, Debt and Tax Shocks Under a Taylor Rule
The e¤ects of government spending shocks in this type of model have been analyzed in a number of previous papers. The only di¤erence here, relative to the previous literature, is the failure of Ricardian equivalence, and the e¤ects of government debt accumulation.
In order to highlight this di¤erence, we …rst examine the impact of a one time shock to government debt. It is easy to solve (25)- (29) to show that the e¤ect of a increase in b t on output and in ‡ation is as follows:
is perceived as an increase in wealth for currently alive cohorts. This leads to an increase in consumption, and a fall in desired saving. Current aggregate demand rises, leading to a rise in in ‡ation. The rise in in ‡ation increases the real interest rate, via the interest rate rule, partly o¤setting the impact of the higher debt on current output. The greater the response to in ‡ation or the output gap in the interest rate rule, the greater the increase in the real interest rate, and the smaller the impact on output and in ‡ation. Note also that the impact of a debt shock depends on the persistence in government debt generated by the government budget constraint. If the debt-sensitive tax rule is such that an initial debt shock is very transitory (i.e. ! very low), the impact on output or in ‡ation is small.
We can now focus on the e¤ects of government spending and taxes. To provide a benchmark comparison with the Ricardian equivalence case, we focus …rst on a government spending expansion …nanced by a tax increase -that is, we calculate the balanced budget multiplier.
Assume that both discretionary taxes and government spending increase by the same amount. In both cases, assume that after the initial increase, both discretionary taxes and spending converge back to their steady state levels at the rate . Then, from (25)- (29), we may compute that:
The …rst thing to note about (??) is that it is independent of , the coe¢ cient on government debt in the aggregate Euler equation. The balanced budget multiplier is the same as that of the standard Ricardian equivalence model, because the policy has no consequences for the evolution of government debt. In addition, it is easily seen that the multiplier is less than unity. That is:
Even though prices are sticky and adjust only slowly in face of changes in aggregate demand, the balanced budget multiplier is actually less than that of the purely ‡exible price equilibrium multiplier. The key reason is that under the (27) monetary policy rule, the real interest rate increases so much in response to a rise in …scal spending (…nanced by taxation) that aggregate private consumption falls. Only in the special case of constant returns in production ( = 0), and no output gap in the interest rate rule ( y = 0) will the multiplier be exactly unity -equal to that of the ‡exible price equilibrium.
This suggests that if the nominal interest rate is free to adjust and follows a standard rule (27) , government spending is a particularly ine¢ cient way to stimulate the economy. The most that a …scal expansion can do is to leave aggregate private consumption unchanged, and in general consumption will fall. Equivalently, we can say that government spending expansion increases output, but output actually falls below the level it would attain in a ‡exible price equilibrium, in face of the same balanced budget government spending increase.
The impact of a balanced budget government expansion on in ‡ation is given by (35). If y = 0 and = 0, the in ‡ation rate is unchanged, because output responds exactly as in a ‡exible price equilibrium. With constant returns ( = 0) and y > 0; in ‡ation will fall, since output is below the ‡exible price equilibrium.
We now turn to the analysis of a tax cut in the model with an interest rate rule. A temporary discretionary tax cut will increase the primary government de…cit and cause a persistent increase in government debt. How will this a¤ect GDP? From (25)-(29) we can establish that:
Note that with Ricardian equivalence, where = 0, this is negative by de…nition. For > 0, we would anticipate that the expression on the right hand side of (??) is negative (tax increases are contractionary). Interestingly however, this is not necessarily true in this model. Take the case where and ! are very close to unity (tax cuts are highly persistent, and the de…cit is closed only very slowly). Then expression (??) is positive for > 1, and therefore a cut in taxes will reduce GDP in the economy where the interest rate follows a Taylor rule! What is the explanation for this? The reason is that, for greater than unity, and su¢ ciently large, a tax cut causes a large o¤setting increase in interest rates, due to its in ‡ationary e¤ects. The impact of a tax cut on current in ‡ation is always positive, and
given by:
A very persistent tax cut signals a persistent increase in future government debt, which causes the forecast of future in ‡ation to rise, increasing current in ‡ation, and leading to a rise in current interest rates. This secondary e¤ect can be actually large enough to reduce aggregate demand and lead to a fall in output. Thus, again, we may conclude that during 'normal times', when the nominal interest rate follows a conventional rule of the type given by (14) , tax cuts are unlikely to be an e¤ective stabilization tool.
Note that we have not yet given a quantitative analysis of the e¤ects of tax cuts and government spending policies in this model. In the discussion of the calibrated model below, we show that for both policies, the multiplier e¤ects of government spending and tax cuts (even if the latter are positive) are likely to be quite low.
Fiscal policies under a zero lower bound.
Now assume that the shock to the discount factor is large enough to push the economy into a liquidity trap -the nominal interest rate is constrained by the zero lower bound 10 . In this case, the dynamics of the economy are fundamentally di¤erent. The e¤ects on in ‡ation and the output gap both of the initial shock as well as the impact of policy measures to counter the shock operate through substantially di¤erent channels when the policy interest rate cannot respond.
In section 2 above, we analyzed the properties of a steady state in which the nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound. By contrast, here we will focus on a situation where the lower bound constraint is temporary; the rise in the discount factor dissipates over time, and the economy's real interest rate returns to its steady state. In a crude way, this captures the impact of an aggregate demand shock coming from an unanticipated temporary rise in the savings rate 11 .
To make the analysis concrete, we follow Eggerston and Woodford (2003, 2005) and Eggertson (2009) in assuming that the discount factor shock drives the economy to the zero lower bound for an uncertain number of periods. We assume a one time shock to the discount factor that continues with probability per period. So in each future period, the discount factor reverts to the steady state with probability 1 . In the intervening time, the discount factor is at its post-shock level, and is su¢ ciently high that the policy implied by the original interest rate rule would require a zero interest rate. As in Eggertson and Solving the model (25)- (29) when i R t = 0, under the assumption that the shock reverts back to steady state with probability 1
, we obtain the impact of the discount rate shock on the output gap and in ‡ation as:
where z = (1 )(1 )(1 ) z. A condition for stability is that z > 0 12 . Note however that z = (1 )(1 ) y + z > 0. Hence in comparing (30) and (38), the impact of a rise in the discount factor on both in ‡ation and the output gap is larger in an economy constrained by the zero lower bound. This is not surprising, and follows as a converse argument to the logic presented above, outlining the response of in ‡ation and the output gap under an interest rate rule. Since the nominal interest rate cannot respond, the fall in demand leads to a fall in output, which reduces in ‡ation, and given the persistence of the shock, the fall in anticipated in ‡ation leads to a rise in the real interest rate, a further 11 In the case of a permanent zero lower bound, the conditions for a unique stable path of adjustment of in ‡ation, output and government debt are not always met. In particular, in the Ricardian equivalence version of this model (when = 0), the conditions for uniqueness in the zero interest rate case are not met for familiar reasons (e.g. Clarida et al. 1999). But with > 0 and allowing for a non-zero initial nominal government debt, there is a 'real balance e¤ect'which may be su¢ cient to restore uniqueness (Ireland 2005), even if the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero forever. Nevertheless, because we are primarily concerned with the analysis of short run stabilization policies, we follow the recent literature and analyze the (somewhat more realitistic) case of a temporary liquidity trap. 12 See Eggertson (2009).
fall in demand, and a larger fall in output. So long as z > 0, this process converges, but to a much lower level of output than would occur under a positive interest rate rule.
How do monetary and …scal policies operate when the interest rate is zero? Again, we focus on the importance of debt and de…cit related policies, given that the key aspect of the analysis is the failure of Ricardian equivalence. In order to make the analysis simple and easily comparable with the previous section, we initially make the special assumption that the …scal policies enacted during the period where the economy is constrained by the zero lower bound are eliminated completely when the constraint is no longer binding, and the economy then reverts immediately to its steady state. This involves the assumption that at the period of the return to positive interest rates, taxes are raised so as to eliminate completely the accumulate government debt that resulted from the …scal policy expansions.
Hence, that the government debt buildup from its initial steady state (or zero) is wiped away, and debt reverts back to zero in the period following the return to positive interest rates. This allows the economy to return to a steady state. This assumption makes the algebraic comparison with the previous section very simple, but it is not a critical feature of the argument. We explore an alternative case below, where the accumulated debt is only gradually eliminated, following the return to a path of positive nominal interest rates.
There we see that all of the points made in this section still remain valid. In fact, because the accumulated debt continues to be treated as net wealth by the cohorts who hold it after the return to positive interest rates, this alternative path of convergence make the impact of current …scal policies even stronger.
First, we may analyze the impact of an arbitrary rise in government debt, in a manner similar to (32) and (33) above.
where ! = (1 )(1 !)(1 ! )) !z: Again, for stability, it is necessary that
As in the case of a positive nominal rate, an increase in government debt leads to a rise in the output gap and a rise in the in ‡ation rate, so long as Ricardian equivalence fails ( > 0):
The quantitative impact may be greater or less than (32) and (33). On the one hand, the nominal interest rate does not respond here, leading to a larger impact on both in ‡ation and the output gap. However, in this experiment, the interest rate rule reverts back to (14) with probability 1
. In the quantitative analysis below, it is shown that the e¤ects of increasing government debt may be greater or less during a liquidity trap than under a positive interest rate rule.
If a rise in the discount factor has a greater negative impact on the output gap in a liquidity trap, it is reasonable to consider that compensating …scal policies would also be more powerful in their ability to stabilize the economy, since an expansion in government spending or a tax cut in this environment does not elicit automatic interest rate responses that limit the extent to the …scal instruments. In this vein, Christiano et al. (2009) and Eggerston (2009) show that government spending policies may have signi…cantly higher multiplier e¤ects in a liquidity trap than during normal times. But again, their analysis was con…ned to the situation of full Ricardian equivalence, where a balanced budget expansion in government spending is identical to a debt …nanced expansion. We now wish to revisit this question, allowing for debt versus tax …nanced spending policies to have di¤erent e¤ects.
As a corollary, we can investigate, as we did above for the case outside the liquidity trap, the e¤ect of tax cuts compared to government spending expansions.
Using (25)- (29) we can establish that a balanced budget increase in government spending has the following impacts on the output gap and in ‡ation.
From (42) we see that the multiplier e¤ect on output exceeds unity whenever (1 g y ) > 0. Hence, the balanced budget government spending multiplier is always greater in a liquidity trap than in the case where the nominal interest rate is positive and responds according to a Taylor rule. But it is not necessarily true that the multiplier is large. When = 0, the multiplier is exactly unity -a balanced budget expansion has no impact at all on private consumption. In addition, we note that the in ‡ationary e¤ects of a balanced budget increase in spending also exceed those under the Taylor rule. This is for two reasons -…rst, in the absence of endogenous interest rate adjustment to the output gap (i.e. y = 0), the multiplier impacts of shocks are greater in the zero lower bound economy anyway, since z < . But in addition, when y > 0; as we saw in expression (34) above, the interest rate response to a government spending increase in the Taylor rule economy will mitigate the impact on in ‡ation in a way that is not present in the zero lower bound economy.
In the economy with the Taylor rule, we saw paradoxically that a tax …nanced spending increase could be more or less expansionary that the equivalent increase …nanced by de…cits.
In the recent rounds of stimulus packages enacted in many countries, an important feature of the spending policies was that they were speci…cally not …nanced by tax increases but by debt issue. In fact, an essential part of the rationale behind the intervention was to combine spending increases with tax cuts so as to stimulate overall spending. When nominal interest
rates cannot be lowered further, this was seen as the last possible channel for stabilization policy. Again however, in the context of our framework, this only makes sense if Ricardian equivalence fails. To examine this argument, we now focus on the e¤ects of tax cuts in the model constrained by the zero lower bound. Again, using (25)- (29), we can derive the responses of the output gap and in ‡ation as:
The expression in (44) is always negative. Hence, in contrast to the case with positive interest rates, tax cuts are always expansionary at the zero lower bound, so long as Ricardian equivalence fails. Tax cuts increase private sector wealth, leading to a fall in private saving and an increase in aggregate demand and output. Tax cuts also increase the growth of government debt. At the same time, tax cuts are also in ‡ationary, as the output gap increases in response to the increase in aggregate demand, as con…rmed by (45). Unlike the case where the Taylor rule applies, however, there is no compensating increase in the policy interest rate resulting from the increase in in ‡ation. This allows the possibility that tax cuts may be substantially more expansionary in the economy stuck at the zero lower bound.
In order to assess the validity of the arguments for de…cit …nancing as an important tool of stabilization, however, we must turn to a quantitative assessment of the strength of these e¤ects.
Quantitative Comparison of Policies
How big are the e¤ects of …scal policy in the economy within a liquidity trap? We take the calibration presented in Table 4 . The parameter values are quite standard and follow the assumptions made in the recent literature in this area, save for the particular assumptions we have made so as to allow for aggregation in the OLG model ( log utility, and linear disutility of leisure). We look at two versions of each model, one with constant returns to scale, and another with decreasing returns to labor, assuming that = 0:3. In the …rst model, we follow Christiano et al. (2009) in setting the discount factor is 0.99, and the Calvo price adjustment is parameter at 0.85, so that = 0:028. In the second version, with = 0:3, the de…nition of is di¤erent, so we choose at a di¤erent value (0.7), and = 10; so as to reproduce = 0:025. We initially set the parameters of the interest rate rule at = 1:5 and y = 0; but we also look at variations on these settings. In addition we set the steady horizon to the consumers in their planning decision. We choose to match this at the quarterly frequency. As regards the parameter , governing the rate of earnings decline over the lifetime, we have little direct evidence to match this. We simply take as a rough estimate the fact that agents spend about two third of adult lives working and one third retired, so we set = 0:6. In combination with the assumption for ; these assumptions imply that is about 0.011 at the quarterly frequency. We should note that this calibration is not guaranteed to enlarge the impact of government de…cits. Even with these assumptions on the planning horizon and wage distribution, we will show that the e¤ects of de…cits under a Taylor rule are very slight.
The parameter , governing the number of periods for which it is anticipated that the zero lower bound on interest rate will apply, is a critical feature of the dynamics. If this is too large, then the stability condition is not satis…ed. We set = 0:8, so that nominal interest rates are anticipated to be zero for 5 quarters 13 . To make the comparison with the economy under the Taylor rule, we also assume that all shocks in that case have persistence equal to 0.8. Table 5 presents quantitative results comparing the e¤ects of policies under the Taylor rule in comparison with the economy constrained by the zero lower bound on interest rates.
In the baseline calibration, we see that the impact of a discount factor shock in the economy at the zero lower bound is orders of magitude more than that of in the economy operating under a Taylor rule. This shock increases the desire to save, reducing current demand and output and in ‡ation. In the economy operating under a Taylor rule, the nominal interest rate will fall, leading to a fall in the real interest rate, reducing the incentive to save.
The equilibrium real interest rate falls. By contrast, when the nominal interest rate cannot respond, the way the increased desired savings is satis…ed in equilibrium is for current output to fall relative to expected future output. But the fall in current output leads to a fall in current in ‡ation, which raises the real interest rate, increasing the desire to save. When < 1, and the stability conditions on the model under the zero lower bound are satis…ed, this process has an eventual equilibrium leading to a very large fall in current output.
The second panel of Table 2 illustrates the impact of …scal policies in both interest rate scenarios, under the baseline calibration with = 0 (constant returns to scale). In both cases, the balanced budget multiplier is unity. Even though the impact of demand shocks is potentially much greater in the zero lower bound economy, in which the real interest rate may respond pathologically, this is a case in which a demand shock requires no real interest rate responses at all. When the government spending expansion is …nanced by current taxation, there is no consequence at all for government debt. Output responds one for one to the expansion both in the current period and all future periods in which the expansion continues. Consumption is una¤ected. As a result, there is no need for the real interest to move. Thus, under this calibration, the zero lower bound has no implication at all for the e¤ects of balanced budget …scal expansions (although as we see below, this conclusion may be substantially altered with di¤erent monetary rules or decreasing returns to scale). Now take the same calibration, but assume that the government spending expansion is de…cit …nanced. This leads to a simultaneous increase in government spending and government debt. The rise in government debt leads to a wealth induced increase in private consumption, as in the aggregate, households choose to save less. As a result, the government spending multiplier exceeds unity in both the economy with positive and zero interest rates.
But the scale of the responses di¤ers dramatically between the Taylor rule economy and the zero lower bound economy. In the Taylor rule case, the expansion in aggregate demand causes an increase in in ‡ation which leads to a rise in the real interest rate. This substantially reduces the impact of government debt on private consumption. The government spending multiplier rises from unity under a balanced budget expansion to only 1.07 in the economy with de…cit …nancing.
In the economy constrained by the zero lower bound, the in ‡ation generated by the increased government spending leads to a fall in the real interest rate. This substantially increases the government spending multiplier. In the baseline case, the multiplier rises from unity under a balanced budget expansion to approximately 2 under de…cit …nancing of government spending. Thus, while tax-…nanced government spending has no additional expansionary e¤ects in a liquidity trap, de…cit …nanced spending is far more expansionary.
When the economy is constrained by the zero lower bound, there is a very large di¤erence in the predicted e¤ects of …scal expansions depending on whether they are …nanced with debt or with taxes. De…cit spending has a much greater impact on output than tax …nanced
spending.
An immediate corollary of these results is that the impact of pure tax cuts, holding the path of government spending …xed, is substantially di¤erent in the Taylor By contrast, at the zero lower bound, the tax cuts have a very big e¤ect. A tax cut of 1 percent of GDP lead to an increase in output equal to about 1 percent of GDP -the tax multiplier is unity. Tax cuts, even though they leave the presented discounted value of tax government tax revenues unchanged, lead to an increase in perceived lifetime wealth or currently alive generations. This increases current demand and output. But this in turn leads to an increase in in ‡ation, which causes a fall in real interest rates, further increasing present aggregate demand.
One aspect of the model that seems somewhat counterfactual is the responses of in ‡ation in a zero lower bound. Since in the model, in ‡ation is purely forward looking, …scal policies can generate substantial e¤ects on in ‡ation, even in a liquidity trap. In fact, the e¤ects of …scal policies on in ‡ation are greater with zero interest rates than the responses under a Taylor rule. We could improve the performance of the model in this respect by introducing some backward looking elements into the in ‡ation process. Table 6 also provides some alternative calibrations. In particular, if the interest rate rule is extended to allow for the output gap, setting y = 0:25, a value close to empirical estimates, then the multiplier impact of all shocks on the output gap is scaled down in the economy governed by the interest rate rule, but the results under the zero lower bound are completely una¤ected. The impact of a discount factor shock on output is smaller, because nominal and real interest rates respond more to the shock. The government spending multiplier is also reduced, because real interest rates rise by more in response to the shock. Interestingly, the government spending shock is now de ‡ationary, because the fall in household consumption causes a fall in real marginal costs. In addition, note that tax cuts become even less expansionary in this case than in the baseline calibration. Table 7 illustrates the case with decreasing returns to scale, setting = 0:3, approximately the measure of capital income share, with the alternative calibration for . The impact of shocks on output is altered signi…cantly under both interest rate scenarios. Under a Taylor rule, the impact of both discount factor shocks and …scal shocks on the output gap is reduced. The reason is that, with decreasing returns to scale, the e¤ect of the output gap on in ‡ation is magni…ed. This precipitates greater compensating responses of nominal and real interest rates, reducing the real e¤ects of shocks. Again, the government de…cit spending multiplier is less than unity, and the impact of tax cuts is only half that of the baseline case.
By contrast, the introduction of decreasing returns dramatically magni…es the e¤ects of government spending policies in the economy with a zero lower bound. The balanced budget multiplier now increases to 1.9. The de…cit spending multiplier is 3.6, and the tax cut multiplier is 1.8. In this case, the …scal expansions have a larger e¤ect on in ‡ation, as marginal cost is more responsive to output movements. This leads to bigger negative e¤ects on real interest rates, generating a much bigger expansion in equilibrium output.
To some extent, the very large responses of real variables under the zero lower bound is generated by the absence of capital in the model. It would be interesting to extend the model to allow for endogenous capital accumulation. The results of Christiano et al. (2009) however suggest that this would not alter the main message of the paper -there is likely to be a very big di¤erence between tax …nanced spending and debt …nanced spending in an economy where the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero.
One assumption we have made is that all the accumulated debt during the zero lower bound phase is immediately retired following a return to positive interest rates. This makes the comparison of the two cases of positive and zero interest rates simple to present. What if we make the alternative assumption; that the debt is retired gradually according to the rule described by (29)? In that case, it turns out that the multiplier e¤ects of debt are larger than under the baseline case above. This is described in Table 8 . While the balanced budget multiplier is still unity, the de…cit …nancing multiplier is over 3, and the tax cut multiplier is over 2. Because debt is expansionary, even in an economy with positive interest rates, the expectation of higher debt in the future is even more expansionary. Note however, unlike the previous case, where the impacts of …scal policy under the zero lower bound did not depend at all on the parmeters of the interest rate rule, these e¤ects will be in ‡uenced by the rule. The more sensitive is the interest rate to the in ‡ation rate or the output gap in the future, after the Taylor rule has been restored, the smaller will be the multiplier e¤ects of current debt …nanced government spending or tax cuts.
Monetary policy options
In to issuing debt. Since the experiment we have looked at above consisted of issuing debt to …nance tax cuts (or spending expansion) which is retired once the economy returns to a positive nominal interest rate, it turns out that the impact of a debt …nanced tax cut described above is in equivalent to to a policy of increasing the money base in order to …nance …scal transfers to the private sector, and then having this operation reversed once the economy returns to a positive nominal interest rate. Thus, to the extent that de…cit …nancing of tax cuts is an e¤ective macroeconomic tool in dealing with a zero interest rate environment, this is also true of a monetary policy expansion as described in this way 15 .
Quantitatively however, it is immediately obvious that the real balance e¤ect cannot be of signi…cance in a¤ecting real GDP. For instance, take a monetary policy operation which directly increases M1, through increasing the money base. In the US, money base has more than doubled in the last two years as a result of the emergency procedures put in place by the Fed. But the total net wealth e¤ects of this are negligible since even after the recent operations, M1 and Money base represent very small fractions of total US private sector net wealth. Thus, the impact of monetary operations via direct real balance e¤ects alone would be small fractions of the debt multipliers reported in Tables 4-8 
Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the impact of government spending, tax cuts, and government de…cits in an economy where monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on policy interest rates. We show that government spending …nanced by de…cits may be far more expansionary than that …nanced by tax increases in such a situation, even if the di¤erence between the two modes of …nancing is small during 'normal' times, when the policy rate is governed by a Taylor rule. From a di¤erent perspective, the paper makes the case that tax cuts alone may be highly expansionary in a liquidity trap, even if they suggest that de…cit …nanced tax cuts alone can be quite successful in targeting aggregate demand. To the extent that a large part of the downturn in the real economy came from a substantial increase in the savings rate, pushing the equilibrium real interest rate below zero, the increase in government debt provided by tax cuts may be seen as directly providing a vehicle for saving on the part of the private sector. This stems the de ‡ationary forces and prevents the perverse response of real interest rates following the initial shock.
One important issue that has not been analyzed is the welfare consequences of …scal policy. There are a number of subtle and di¢ cult features associated with welfare evaluation in the present model. First, the model allows for dynamic ine¢ ciency, which in this context, implies that the steady state net real interest rate may be negative. In that case, it is well known that an increase in government debt can be Pareto improving. But this argument is not relevant for the analysis of section 5, since the fall in real interest rates in our experiment is a temporary phenomenon. Secondly, an analysis of welfare in the present model would limited because the model does not incorporate capital accumulation. Hence, the standard crowding out e¤ects of government debt on the long run capital stock is absent in the analysis. As shown in section 4 above, government debt has no impact on steady state output or consumption, but simply increases the steady state real interest rate, tilting the time pro…le of spending for each generation. Thus, it is likely that the …rst order e¤ects of government debt on steady state welfare would be missing from the analysis.
Nevertheless, there is still a possibility for increasing welfare through various …scal policy instruments when the economy is in a liquidity trap. In particular, Christiano et al (2009) show that in a liquidity trap, an increase in direct government spending above the ‡exible price optimum value of spending can increase welfare. Pursuing this analysis in our model is more di¢ cult, because we do not have a natural social welfare function with which to compare utilities across generations. Calvo and Obstfeld (1989) Clearly the full exploration of short run welfare trade-o¤s in the present model represents an interesting research question. Nevertheless we defer such an analysis to future research. Figure 2 
